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From Giving Birth to Paid Labor: 
The Effects of Adult Education for Prime-Aged Mothers
*
 
Women without work after childbirth are at risk of losing their connection to the labor market. 
However, they may participate in adult education programs. We analyze the effect of this on 
the duration to work and on the wage rate, by applying conditional difference-in-differences 
approaches. We use Swedish matched longitudinal register data sets covering the full 
population. The Swedish adult education program is unprecedented in its size, and 
enrollment is universally available at virtually no cost. We focus on low-skilled women who 
have recently given birth. We take account of program accessibility, selection issues, course 
heterogeneity, the income received during adult education, parental leave, and child care 
fees. To understand the enrollment decision from the mothers' point of view, we use the 
estimates to calibrate a job search model. 
 
 
JEL Classification:  H43, J68, J64, J24, C14 
  
Keywords:  evaluation of adult education, job search model, female labor supply, wages, 





Gerard J. van den Berg 
Department of Economics 
VU University Amsterdam 
De Boelelaan 1105 
1081 HV Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
E-mail: gjvdberg@xs4all.nl     
 
                
 
                                                 
* We are grateful for helpful suggestions from Louise Kennerberg, Ann-Sofie Kolm, Laura Larsson, 
Linus Lindqvist, Daniela Lundin, Erik Mellander, Eva Mörk, Oskar Nordström-Skans, and participants 
in conferences in Uppsala, Essen, Budapest, Oslo, and Nuremberg, and a seminar at IFAU Uppsala. 
We thank Linda Petterson from the local employment office in Stockholm for giving us information on 
institutional features and on the decision process by case workers concerning reintegration. We thank 
Eva Mörk for generously giving us data on child care costs. Linus Lindqvist and Louise Kennerberg 
provided excellent help with the register data. We thank the Swedish National Labour Market Board 
(AMS) and Statistics Sweden (SCB) for their permission to use the data, and IFAU for financial 
support. The work in this paper is part of the ESRC Research Program “Advancing Programme 
Evaluation Methods”. 1 Introduction
During the past decades, a substantial amount of research has been conducted on
the e®ect of labor market policies on the individual employment prospects (for
overviews see e.g. Fay, 1996; Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; Martin and
Grubb, 2001; and Calmfors, Forslund and HemstrÄ om, 2001). It is commonly ac-
knowledged that e®ects are heterogeneous. Often, employment e®ects are larger
for women (Bergemann and Van den Berg, 2008; Heckman, LaLonde and Smith,
1999; King, 2004). At the same time, participants with a low initial level of
education typically bene¯t little from educational training (Heckman, LaLonde
and Smith, 1999). The average employment rate of low-skilled individuals is sub-
stantially lower than of high-skilled individuals (66% vs. 87% in 2005, see OECD,
2007), and among the former, the labor market ¯gures for the group of low-skilled
mothers with children are particularly weak. In 2005, the OECD average employ-
ment rate of women with less than secondary education is only 48% (OECD,
2007), and it is even lower if they have children (OECD, 2002).
The fact that mothers with young children constitute a particularly weak labor
market group has potentially harmful long-run e®ects. They they may postpone
a return to the labor market, for example until the child goes to school, or they
may decide to have another child, and in the intervening years, the women may
lose skills. This may further reduce their incentive to return to work. The ensuing
income loss may negatively a®ect the child's development.
Our knowledge of labor market policy e®ects for this group is still very limited.
In order to help these women to (re-)integrate in the labor market, and to raise
their productivity, it is useful to obtain insights into the e®ectiveness of active
labor market programs and education programs for this group.1 In this paper we
examine the e®ect of participation in adult education programs on the duration
to work and the labor income of low-skilled women who have recently given birth.
Adult education is a relevant program for this group, because its access is not
restricted to those entitled to unemployment insurance or welfare bene¯ts, and
it is therefore also open to mothers who do not have any source of income next
1Recently, life-long learning, adult education, and employability have become focal points in
the labor market policies of many advanced economies (see e.g. OECD Employment Outlook
2004). It is expected that these economies will face more turbulent conditions than in the past,
and that the development of novel production technologies will proceed at a sustained high
speed, and this requires a °exible and suitably skilled workforce.
2to their partner's income. After a child caring phase, women may not eligible for
unemployment insurance and the associated training programs provided by the
employment o±ces. We focus on Sweden. Despite Sweden's well-known success
in integrating skilled women into the labor market, it faces the same problems
as basically all OECD countries with respect to women with less than upper
secondary education. Sweden is well-suited for our analysis because of the mag-
nitude of its adult education program Komvux. Sweden has a long tradition of
training adult workers (see e.g. Ministry of Education, 1998; Friberg, 2000; and
Ministry of Industry, 2001). In 1997 the program was modernized, and, in the
period 1997{2002, the program was dramatically expanded in order to raise the
skill level of low-skilled workers to a medium skill level, accordingly focusing on
workers without work and with a low level of education. The size of the program
is unprecedented: for example, over the period 1997-2000, the number of partici-
pants exceeded 10% of the labor force. Clearly, the program re°ects a great deal
of optimism about the extent to which an adult's human capital can be improved.
For the empirical analysis, we use a combination of longitudinal administra-
tive register data which contains the full population of individuals in Sweden.
The dataset matches detailed records from employment o±ces, unemployment
insurance agencies, the income tax agency, and the adult education register. The
latter contains records of all adult education courses that are followed.
The data include wage register data by employer. These enable the construc-
tion of an accepted-wage variable, which is obviously more informative on pro-
ductivity e®ects than annual income from e.g. income tax registers. Wage-rate
outcomes should not be subject to pre- and post-program participation dips.
Concerning income out of work, we have separate information on unemployment
bene¯ts, adult education grants, parental leave bene¯ts, and child care fees. The
merging and simultaneous use of these data is a non-trivial task as it requires the
combination of di®erent sources. We use information on the eligibility and max-
imum entitlement period of the various income sources, by applying the relevant
guidelines.
We do not address equilibrium e®ects of adult education. Albrecht, Van den
Berg and Vroman (2008) calibrate the e®ects of Swedish adult education in the
period 1997-2002, taking into account that the composition of jobs may respond
in equilibrium to changes in the skill distribution. BjÄ orklund et al. (2005) show
that Komvux recently led to a large °ow of teachers from regular secondary
education to adult education, and they argue that the program therefore may
3have generated substantial negative external e®ects on the quality of regular
education. Such e®ects increase the social costs of the program, but addressing
this is beyond the scope of the present paper. Since mothers with small children
constitute a small fraction of all participants, it is unlikely that they contribute to
equilibrium e®ects. We also do not aim to address the use of adult education by
young individuals who left the regular school system with low educational levels,
as a short-cut towards regular university education (see e.g. BjÄ orklund et al.,
2005, and EkstrÄ om, 2003, for discussions). For this reason we exclude individuals
aged below 25.
To date, some studies have examined the e®ects of adult education in Sweden
on individual labor market outcomes. EkstrÄ om (2003) estimates the e®ect on an-
nual income of following adult education in the early 1990s, using straightforward
di®erence-in-di®erences. She ¯nds no positive income e®ects. Albrecht, Van den
Berg and Vroman (2004) use similar methods to study e®ects on annual income
and employment status, and they ¯nd no signi¯cant e®ects for women aged be-
tween 25 and 40. The latter study does not distinguish between recent mothers
and other women, and its sample size may be too small to detect any e®ects.
Several other studies have compared individual labor market outcomes between
unemployed individuals who enroll in Komvux and unemployed individuals who
enroll in labor market training, using propensity score matching or IV methods
(see e.g. Axelsson and Westerlund, 1999, and Stenberg and Westerlund, 2008).
The results depend strongly on the outcome measure, the evaluation method,
and the type of labor market training and subpopulation considered.
Our estimation results indicate positive average e®ects. Because participation
is not restricted, this raises the question why participation rates are low. We use
the e®ect estimates to address the enrollment decision from the point of view
of the mother. To this aim we calibrate a dynamic job search model augmented
with adult education (see Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007, for a survey on the
structural estimation of job search models). The model distinguishes between
e®ects on the rate at which jobs are found and e®ects on wages, and it allows
for subsequent childbirths. Calibration requires additionally gathered information
on the income associated with parental leave, the income grant during Komvux
participation, and the costs of child care.
The model assumes that the enrollment decision is taken with an eye on the
expected discounted future utility streams of the available options. These streams
also depend on short-term outcomes that are typically ignored in the treatment
4e®ect literature. For example, an evaluation study may ¯nd that the average ef-
fect on the employment probability is positive, but for an eligible individual the
present discounted value of participation may be negative because of the time
needed to complete the program. Our analysis produces the additional interest-
ing insight that small changes in the employment probability may be associated
with large changes in the expected discounted value of program participation
and relatively large changes in the exit rate to work. As a result, the unemployed
individuals' present value can be greatly enhanced (and their unemployment du-
ration can be substantially reduced) by a program that only leads to a slightly
higher employment rate. This is because employment rates are typically rather
unresponsive functions of the job o®er arrival rate.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses institutional features
of the environment of recent mothers in Sweden, including the adult education
program. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 outlines the estimation
method we use and discusses the empirical implementation. Section 5 provides
the estimation results. In Section 6 we analyze the enrollment decision using a
structural job search model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional context
2.1 Adult education
By now, many studies provide detailed descriptions of Komvux and their partici-
pants (see, for example, The National Agency for Education, 1999, Axelsson and
Westerlund, 1999, Statistics Sweden, 2005, Skolverket, 2001, Stenberg, 2003, and
EkstrÄ om, 2003). We therefore restrict ourselves to a summary.
Our observation window concerning participation in Komvux runs from 1997
to 2002. In this period, the adult education program was larger than ever before in
Sweden.2 The main objective of the program was to increase the skill level of adult
low-skilled workers to the medium skill level, thereby helping these individuals
strengthen their position in the labor market. Here, low skilled means having an
educational attainment below the level of a 3-year \gymnasium" degree, while
medium skilled means having attained this level but not any education beyond
that. The 3-year gymnasium degree roughly corresponds to the upper secondary
2The program in these years is also denoted as \Adult Education Initiative" and \Knowledge
Lift".
5education level or senior high school. Since 1995 this is the lowest possible upper
secondary school diploma, whereas before that many individuals left high school
with a 2-year degree. The program particularly targets low skilled individuals
that are unemployed or have withdrawn from the labor force. In fact, low-skilled
employed and medium-skilled unemployed workers or individuals that have left
the labor force are also often eligible for Komvux, and the enrollees contain
many low-skilled employed workers, working part time or full time. Komvux also
includes courses that do not aim at the attainment of a medium skill level but
rather an improvement within the class of low skill sublevels.
Komvux focuses on the enhancement of general skills (for example, English,
Swedish, and mathematics), as opposed to speci¯c skills needed for particular
professions. However, part of Komvux can be spent in orientation courses, voca-
tional courses and work placement. In principle, it is possible to combine upper
secondary courses with studies at an elementary level or with a program orga-
nized by the National Labor Market Board for the unemployed. The curriculums
and grade criteria for the attainment of the medium skill level are roughly the
same as in the regular upper secondary education system.
Komvux is organized at the municipal level. The organization may be joint
with other municipalities. A municipality may purchase the services of education
providers and/or cooperate with them. However, the municipalities are responsi-
ble for admission into Komvux. A single course typically starts twice a year and
covers a half-year term. Many courses are o®ered on a full{time basis, but some
are o®ered as a part{time course or, more speci¯cally, as an evening course.
At the level of the individual, admission into Komvux is in principle free. The
underlying view is that Komvux participation must be led by the demand for
education. A participant should have ample scope for personal choice regarding
the type of study and its timing and location. Whether one can participate in
a desired course only depends on the availability of courses and on the entry
skill level requirement. Recruitment of participants is sometimes carried out in
cooperation with trade union organizations or local employment o±ces.
Komvux participants may be eligible for a range of income grants and ¯-
nancial study support grants. Most importantly, enrollees may receive \special
education support" (UBS). The amount of this is equivalent to unemployment
insurance (UI). UBS is only given to Komvux participants who are entitled to
UI payments at the date of entry into the program. They must be registered as
unemployed or have been employed in the last 5 years and being replaced at the
6workplace by a long-term unemployed individual. Moreover, the worker must be
between 25{55 years old inclusive at the date of entry into the program and must
study at the elementary or upper secondary level or attend an orientation course.
The funding for the UBS grants is limited. Priority is given to workers without
completed education at the elementary level and workers who intend to study
Swedish, English, mathematics or social sciences. The grant is typically given for
a maximum of one year. Because of the cap on UBS funding, a Komvux partic-
ipant may not be granted UBS, and she may not know a long time in advance
whether UBS will be granted to her or not.
Additionally, special adult study assistance and funding are available as a
combination of a grant and a loan. Unemployed individuals can for example apply
for a grant (SVUXA) in case they had been working for 3 year and are at least 21
years old. The grant amounts to 65% of the UI bene¯t or some minimum amount
in case an individual is not eligible for unemployment bene¯ts. The funding for
SVUXA is limited. A ¯rst come, ¯rst serve rule is applied.
Employed individuals, individuals taking care of children/handicapped per-
sons or handicapped individuals can apply for a di®erent type of grant in case
they study on a elementary or upper secondary level (SVUX). Again, funding is
limited, with priority for individuals with a low education level who are in need
of education and take a break from work in order to study.
Individuals who receive SVUXA or SVUX are entitled to a supplementary
loan from the government. This loan and the grant together should be equivalent
to UI.
Many participants rely on other ¯nancial resources than those listed above.
Notably, they may depend partly or fully on a partner's income. An individual
who is full-time in Komvux is considered to be out of the labor force unless he/she
earns income on the side.
The state channels funds to the municipalities to ¯nance Komvux. The amount
of funding depends on the municipality's unemployment rate and skill level distri-
bution, and on the scope of the municipality's program. A conservative estimate
is that, in the ¯rst years of its existence, the state spent at least SEK 3.5 billion
(US $400M) per year on Komvux. This equals almost SEK 1000 per labor force
participant in Sweden. The spending covered the creation of some 100,000 annual
study slots as of 1997. In practice, the funding was more than su±cient to meet
the demand for Komvux (see Statskontoret, 1999). This fact is important for our
analyses because it implies that there was no quantity rationing.
7The following gives an indication of the size of the program in terms of num-
bers of enrollees. In the fall of 1997, 538,004 individuals (out of a population
of 8M) were (i) aged between 25 and 55, and (ii) participated in the municipal
adult education, or were unemployed (in the sense of actively searching), or par-
ticipated in one or more training programs. About 220,000 of these participated in
Komvux, and of these about 56,000 received UBS. About 35,000 Komvux partic-
ipants were also registered as unemployed, so they are necessarily only part-time
in Komvux. Another 5,000 participated both in Komvux and in employment
training. The number of registered unemployed, including those participating in
Komvux and/or training programs was about 330,000. For comparison, the num-
ber of pupils in regular upper secondary school was about 300,000, while the
number of individuals participating in employment training programs was about
40,000.3 The ¯gures do not sum to the total of 538,004 because some individuals
fall into more than one category. Typically, the number of individuals enrolled
in Komvux is about 50% larger than the full-time equivalent of the number of
occupied slots. This indicates that many enrollees are part-time participants.
Skolverket (2001) provides a wealth of additional information on the composition
of participants and courses.
2.2 Unemployment insurance
The eligibility requirements for unemployment insurance are as follows:
(i). General requirement: Being registered as unemployed, immediately avail-
able for work, and actively seeking paid work,
(ii). Work requirement: Having worked already for some time in the last 12
months or having ¯nished full{time studies,
(iii). Membership requirement: Member of an Unemployment Insurance Fund
An individual is entitled to income-related unemployment bene¯ts if she meets
all three requirements. In the time period from 1996 to 2004 the replacement
3Participation in adult education is so large that the substantial increase in the unemploy-
ment rate in 2004 has been attributed to the cutbacks in the adult education program shortly
before, the argument being that many individuals who would otherwise have been recorded
as non-participants due to their participation in Komvux are now registered as unemployed
instead (Swedish Institute, 2005). Note that this suggests that quantity rationing may be an
issue after our observation window.
8ratio, the number of bene¯t days and the maximum level repeatedly changed (see
Table 2.2). As an example, in 2001, bene¯ts replaced up to 80% of the previous
wage. The maximum bene¯ts amounted to SEK 580 per day, or SEK 680 for the
¯rst 100 days. If individual met only the requirements (i) and (ii) the she could
receive the so-called \basic amount". This equalled SEK 240 per day in 2001.
Bene¯ts were payable for up to 300 days in 2001, with a maximum of ¯ve days
per calendar week. Payment is stopped in case of participation in an active labor
market program or adult education program or in case of parental leave, and
can be continued thereafter. The Unemployment Insurance Fund may decide to
extend the period of bene¯t by an additional 300 bene¯t days. Anyone not granted
another 300 days or having used up 600 bene¯t days and still being unemployed
can obtain a place in the activity guarantee program.4 During participation in
an active labor market policy (ALMP) program, individuals receive the so called
\activity support" which equals the UI bene¯ts level.
2.3 Parental leave
Parents have the right to be absent from work for a period of one and a half years
after childbirth, without any compensation from the state. One may also leave
work and receive \parental allowance" income, organized by the national insur-
ance system. Speci¯cally, if a parent is drawing a parental allowance (maximum
of 450 days in 2001) as part of the national social insurance system she is entitled
to leave work.
To be entitled to earnings-related parental insurance one has to have been
working for a certain minimum number of days (about 3/4 of a year). In 2001
the social insurance paid 80 % of the annual salary up to 7.5 times the so called
4This activity guarantee program was introduced in August 2000 for unemployed individ-
uals who are, or risk becoming, long{term unemployed (more than 2 years of unemployment)
(EUROSTAT, 2003). It intended to put an end to the vicious circle between unemployment
measures and unemployment bene¯ts. Participants receive intensive guidance in groups of 10-
15 people while having access to all standard labor market policy programs. A job seeker and
her job counsellor are expected to jointly work out an action plan. All activities are full{time.
The job seeker participates in the activity guarantee program until she ¯nds a job for more
than six months, begins a regular course of studies, or chooses to leave the program. Those
who are eligible for income{related bene¯ts from an Unemployment Insurance Fund receive
activity support during participation in the activity guarantee program (payment by the social




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1: Unemployment Bene¯ts
Source: Swedish Institute 1997a, 2001, 2005; Regn¶ er, 2002; Bennmarker, Carling, and
Homlund, 2005; and EUROSTAT, 2003.
10\higher price base amount", which for 2001 is SEK 36,900. The higher price base
amount is linked to the consumer price index in order to ensure that the bene¯ts
maintain their value (Ministry of Health and Social A®airs, 2001). The earnings
related parental allowance is based on the estimated earnings the individual would
have had during the parental leave.
In 2001, parents who received a baby are entitled to 360 days of earnings-
related bene¯ts. Parents on low income or no income at all receive a minimum
guaranteed bene¯t of SEK 60 per day. In an additional 90 days, parents receive
bene¯ts at the universally applicable °at rate that also amounts to SEK 60 per
day in 2001. The 450 days of cash bene¯ts are divided equally among parents. A
parent may transfer 180 days to the other parent. In contrast to the unemploy-
ment bene¯t system, the days considered also include Saturdays and Sundays.
In the time period from 1995 to 2004, the replacement ratio, bene¯t days and
payment ceiling underwent some changes (see Table 2.3).
Finally, all parents who were full time employed were given the legal right to
reduce work hours at own cost to 75% until the child is 8 years old.
2.4 Child care
Since 1995, municipalities are legally obliged to supply day care for parents who
work or study. During 2001 to 2002 a number of reforms were introduced with the
aim of improving access to child care for unemployed and those taking parental
leave to look after o®spring (unemployed: 1 July 2001; parents taking parental
leave: 1 January 2002; see Ministry of Education, 2005). In addition, since 1
January 2003, for 3 hours per day during school term, attendance is free of charge
for those aged 4{5 years (this is called universal pre{school).
In general, child care in Sweden is not for free, and during the 1990s child
care actually became more expensive. Fees were raised and increasingly linked to
family income as well as the child's hours of attendance. This new fee structure
worked as a disincentive to ¯nd work, for mothers who were unemployed or out
of the labor force. Often, a considerable amount of the increase in family income
went into child care fees (Swedish Institute, 2004). To counteract this develop-
ment, a system of maximum child care fees was introduced on 1 January 2002.
This involved a ceiling for the amount parents could be required to pay for their
child (Skolverket, 2003).













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Parental Leave Bene¯ts
Source: Swedish Institute, 1997b, 2000; Ministry of Health and Social A®airs 2003, 2005; National Social
Insurance Board 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, see http://www.forsakringskassan.se/
121% of the family's income, depending on whether it is the ¯rst, second or
third child. There is a maximum amount of SEK 1,140 per month for the
family's ¯rst child, SEK 760 for the second child, and SEK 380 for the third
child.
(ii). In the school age child care system, the fee charged should be less than or
equal to 2 % or 1% of the family's income, depending on whether it is the
¯rst or second child. The fee should not be higher than SEK 760 per month
for the family's ¯rst child and SEK 380 for the second and third child.
Local authorities can decide whether they introduce the fee ceiling. The state
o®ers compensation to those who do. In the ¯rst year, 288 out of 290 local au-
thorities joined. The remaining two joined later.
The maximum fee substantially reduced the amount parents pay for child
care. In 2001, fees contributed 18% to the gross child care cost. In 2002, after the
reform, the percentage declined to 11%. The new fee system increases the subsidy
rate for most families and should tend to increase the labor force participation
for mothers (Kolm and Lazear, 2006). However, an evaluation of the short{run
e®ects of the reform does not show a signi¯cant increase of the employment rate
for mothers. (Lundin, MÄ ork and Ä Ockert, 2007).
3 The data
3.1 The data registers
Our dataset covers the population of inhabitants in Sweden. These individuals
have been longitudinally traced in a number of di®erent administrative registers
covering (subsets of) the period 1994{2003. Our dataset matches the records of
individuals across these registers.
The ¯rst register is the o±cial Swedish register of labor market statistics
RAMS. It is obtained from yearly income tax declarations. It includes informa-
tion from the population register, which is used to create the sample. The register
provides observations on an annual basis of various types of income that each
individual may receive together with the months an individual may work. Specif-
ically, we observe individual wage incomes and income from self-employment.
The RAMS data also provide information on the employer. More information on
income de¯nitions is provided in Subsection 3.2.
13The second register is the so-called HÄ ANDEL dataset, which is based on
registers at the employment o±ce and is compiled by the Swedish Labor Market
Board. It includes all individuals who ever registered as unemployed starting from
September 1991. Registration is voluntary but is required in order to receive or
apply for unemployment compensation or to participate in any type of labor
market program, so in fact almost all unemployed are in these data (according to
Carling, Holmlund and Vejsiu, 2001, more than 90% of the individuals who are
ILO-unemployed according to labor force surveys also register at the employment
o±ces).
The HÄ ANDEL data provide labor market histories for all its individuals on a
daily basis, with dates of transitions between di®erent labor market states and
between open unemployment and participation in training programs and work
experience programs. However, because participation in Komvux is regarded as an
out-of-the-labor-force activity, HÄ ANDEL by itself does not allow for observation
of spells of Komvux participation.
The third register (ASTAT) is from the unemployment insurance fund. It pro-
vides week by week information on the amount of unemployment compensation
that is received.
The fourth register (KOMVUX) contains individual records on participation
in any adult education program. These data are available for the years 1985{2002.
From this we can follow participation in adult education on a basis of six-month
periods at the individual level. Therefore, for all individuals for all semesters
there is a speci¯c variable recording whether the individual has been in Komvux
in that semester. This includes those whose participation is subsidized as well
as those who do not get subsidy. There is also information about whether the
course(s) taken were day or evening courses, and about the municipality where
the course was taken. For the years 1997{2002, additional detailed information on
adult education experiences is available, like course content and hours attended.
The register is available until and including the year 2002.
The ¯fth register (LOUISE: Database for Education, Income and Employ-
ment) contains detailed information on additional income sources on an annual
basis (i.e. educational grant, paternity leave bene¯ts, social allowance) and in-
dividual speci¯c information (i.e. education, municipality and marital status).
These data are collected by Statistics Sweden.
In addition, we use the\generation register". This data set provides informa-
tion on the month of birth and identi¯ers for the parents.
143.2 Variable de¯nitions, sample selection, and data sum-
maries
The Appendix to the paper contains a detailed description of the data registers,
the variables in the registers, and the way we select our sample and construct
the variables of interest from these registers. We also provide an account of the
practical problems and inconsistencies that arose. In this subsection we focus on
the main issues.
We restrict attention to women who are aged between 25 and 45 on December
31, 1996. This is because individuals below 25 have access to di®erent active labor
market programs, educational opportunities, and remuneration eligibilities while
unemployed or in education (see e.g. Larsson, 2003). As noted in Section 1, young
individuals who left the regular school system with low educational levels may use
Komvux as a short-cut towards regular university education (see e.g. EkstrÄ om,
2003). With the age restriction we basically avoid evaluating these cases. In the
event, that we nevertheless observe women going to university we exclude them
from our analysis.
We only consider low-skilled individuals, i.e. having less than three years of
upper secondary education in 1996. This restriction is consistent with the main
Komvux objective in 1997{2002 to raise the skill level of low-skilled workers. We
exclude individuals who went into Komvux in the time between 1996 and the
moment of childbirth, since these may have already increased their skill level in
that time interval. The modernization of Komvux was implemented starting in
the second half of 1997 (which we denote by 97-II). We take this as the ¯rst
possible treatment semester. We focus on women who have given birth in 1996
and after. The major increase in the size of Komvux ended at the end of 02-
II. Since we do not have many time periods after 02-II in some essential data
registers, we decide to stop following individuals after 03-II. In order to be able
to observe women for a su±cient amount of time after childbirth, we restrict
attention to women giving birth in 00-II or earlier.
We assume that each childbirth in this period of 96-I to 00-II is immediately
followed by a 10-month maternity leave period. This equals the average length of
the maternity leave period in those years (Eriksson, 2005). Since then the aver-
age length has been increasing, and this has led to the common perception that
women tend to have maternity leave periods of at least one year.5 After mater-
5In a sensitivity analysis with respect to the treatment e®ects, we also checked whether our
15nity leave, the individual can move between the states of Komvux, unemploy-
ment, non-participation, employment, \bearing another child" and participation
in labor market training. We focus on the e®ects of Komvux for women who are
unemployed or out-of-the labor force at some point after the maternity leave. We
stop following individuals after a transition into \bearing another child" or labor
market training program.6
We decided to time-aggregate the outcome variables into a semester format.
We therefore assign one state to each individual in each semester. The assigned
state is the most dominant state among the actually occupied states in that
semester, in the sense of covering the largest number of days (see the Appendix
for details). We also assign an income variable to this most dominant state. The
calibration analysis also requires income levels in counterfactual states.
The construction of the employment income (i.e. wage) variable deserves some
discussion. These are taken from ¯rm registers. Speci¯cally, the employment in-
formation and the wage data is taken from the wage information which ¯rms are
obliged to give to the tax authorities. For every calendar year, all ¯rms have to
inform the tax authorities about the employment duration of each employee (on
a monthly basis) and on his/her yearly wage. The employment duration of an
individual in a speci¯c year is given by the start month and the end month. In
addition, there is a variable for the wage paid during this employment relation-
ship.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 3 gives an overview over the labor market situation of the low-skilled moth-
ers in our sample. Their employment rate in the ¯rst half of 1995 equals 49%.
When comparing the distribution of labor market states before and after the ma-
ternity leave, it becomes obvious that the proportion of employed women stays
relatively constant with around 62% having a job. The proportion of unemployed
vs. out{of{the{labor{force changed slightly. Before maternity leave 33% were un-
employed and 5% out{of{the labor force, whereas two semesters after the mater-
nity leave 31% were unemployed and 8% were out{of{the{labor{force, indicating
some loss of labor market attachment among those women.
The relatively low employment rate in 1995-I compared to the employment
results change when assuming a 12-month maternity leave period. And in fact, they did not.
6See Table 12 in the Appendix for a detailed summary of the sample selection criteria.
16rate before and after maternity leave is partly due to the worse labor market
situation in 1995 compared to later years and partly due to the conditioning in
the second perspective on being before and after maternity leave and not during.
These ¯gures indicate that child birth does not increase the risk of losing a
job, at least not immediately after the child is born. This might raise the question
why low skilled mothers have such a low employment rate. One reason could be
that it is more di±cult to return for these women to work once they have lost
their work. Note, however, that in our analysis, we take the low employment rate
as given and focus on whether adult education can help to improve the labor
market situation of low skilled mothers.
Table 3 also depicts participation rates in adult education. Hereby, we dis-
tinguish two di®erent forms of participation. Participation in the broader sense
encompasses all forms of participation i.e as soon as attendance is at least 1 hour.
In contrast, participation in the narrower sense only includes women who attend
courses of adult education for a signi¯cant amount of time and intensity, which
we de¯ne as participation for at least 350 hours during 2 to 4 semesters. This is
equivalent to at least half a year in a regular upper{secondary school.
The highest participation rate in adult education can be found among women
who are unemployed after maternity leave. 39% of these women go at a later
point in time into the Komvux program for at least 1 hour. However only 19
% go into Komvux for a signi¯cant amount of time and intensity. The group of
women who are out{of{the{labor{force have the second highest participation rate
with about 23% for at least 1 hour, but only 9 % for a signi¯cant amount of time
and intensity. Although women who are employed after maternity leave have the
lowest probability of going in Komvux, nevertheless still 17%, respectively 7%
participate.
In our evaluation we focus on women who are either unemployed or out{of{the
labor force just before participation in Komvux, estimating the treatment e®ects
separately for these two groups. We consider an individual as participant if she
goes into Komvux according to the narrower de¯nition. The control group of
nonparticipants consists of those who are also either unemployed or out{of{the{
labor{market and do not follow a course of Komvux at all during our observation
window.
Concerning unemployment, our sample consists of approximately 23.000 women
whereof approximately 4,000 (17%) attended Komvux (see Table 4).
Among those who did not enter Komvux, 24% are employed 5 years after their
17Table 3: Labor Market Situation of Low{Skilled Mothers
Employment rate in 1995-I 49%
Employment states in semester before maternity leave:
employed 62%
unemployed 33%
out of the labor force 5%
Employment states two semester after maternity leave:
employed 61% later in Komvux in the broader sense: 17%
in the narrower sense: 7%
unemployed 31% later in Komvux in the broader sense: 39%
in the narrower sense:19%
out{of{the labor force 8% later in Komvux in the broader sense: 23%
in the narrower sense: 9%
Note: Recall that here as well as in the other tables below, employment rates and
employment states are semesterly constructs.
maternity leave, 15% are unemployed, 5% are out{of{the{labor{force, 26% had
another child in the meantime, 10% went into a labor market training program,
and 20% can not be observed anymore due to the end of the observation window.
Participants, in contrast, are more likely to be observed either employed (35%)
or unemployed (32%) 5 years after maternity leave, less often to have another child
(9%), go less often into labor market training (4%) or reach the end of the obser-
vation window (15%). Only, the proportion of women who leave the labor force
is similarly high among the participants and the nonparticipants. Once former
participants found a job they have a slightly higher wage than nonparticipat-
ing women. Another noteworthy fact is that the proportion of Scandinavian and
Non-Scandinavian women is relatively similar among the participants and then
nonparticipants.
When participating, 88% of the unemployed women received a grant (see
Table 5). Only 9% of the women followed a course trajectory that contained
more than 25% Mathematics. Also the proportion of women following English
of Swedish more than a quarter of the time (32%) or some orientation courses
(27%) is not particularly high. The highest proportion of women (86%) follow
18other courses than Mathematics, English and Swedish, or orientation courses for
a signi¯cant amount of time.





Employment states 5 years after maternity leave:
(Excluding participants who still need to ¯nish Komvux)
Employment 35% 24%
Unemployment 32% 15%
Out of the labor force 5% 5%
Right-censored because of childbirth 9% 26%
Right-censored because of training program 4% 10%
Right-censored because of observation window 15% 20%
Average semesterly wage SEK 82,800 SEK 80,200
Our sample contains approximately 3.000 Non{Scandinavian women of whom
17% participated in Komvux, a similar participation rate as for the Scandinavian
women. The main di®erences between the Non-Scandinavian and the Scandina-
vian women lie in the lower employment rate of Non{Scandinavian ¯ve years after
maternity leave (see Table 6) and a lower wage once their are employed. This ap-
plies to both, participants and nonparticipants. The lower employment rate ¯nds
its counterpart in a higher rate of being out{of{the{labor{force. Another remark-
able di®erence can be found in a lower probability of Non{Scandinavian to receive
a grant (73% vs. 88%) (see Table 7). In addition, once they participate, they tend
to study Swedish or English and are are more likely to follow orientation courses
compared to Scandinavian women.
Women who are out{of{the{labor{force at some point after maternity leave
display quite a di®erent labor market behavior compared to those who are un-
employed (see Table 8). Our sample consists of around 19,000 women of whom
only 3% participate in Komvux. Of the participants, 40% are in employment 5
19Table 5: Course Characteristics: Unemployed Before (Potential) Participation
Receive grant 88%
More than 25% Mathematics 9%
More than 25% Swedish or English 32%
Some orientation course 27%
More than 25% other courses 86%




Employment states 5 years after maternity leave:
(Excluding participants who still need to ¯nish Komvux)
Employment 29% 20%
Unemployment 30% 16%
Out of the labor force 8% 8%
Right-censored because of childbirth 9% 22%
Right-censored because of training program 7% 13%
Right-censored because of observation window 18% 21%
Average semesterly wage SEK 80,100 SEK 77,700
years after parental leave, whereas 17% are unemployed. In contrast 28% of the
nonparticipants are in employment and 4% unemployed. It is noteworthy that
the proportion of Scandinavian is lower among the participants than among the
nonparticipants and that right censoring due to participation in a labor mar-
ket training program among the nonparticipants is particularly low with 2%.
The wage di®erence is comparable to the unemployment sample. Similarly com-
parable is the observations that participants have less often a child (9%) than
nonparticipants (26%)
With respect to the course characteristics (see Table 9), it should be noted
that a smaller percentage of the out{of{the labor market sample receives a grant
20Table 7: Course Characteristics: Non{Scandinavian Unemployed Before (Poten-
tial) Participation
Receive grant 73%
More than 25% Mathematics 11%
More than 25% Swedish or English 55%
Some orientation course 36%
More than 25% other courses 54%
compared to the unemployment sample, which is in accordance to the grant
regulations (see section 2.1. In addition, one should note that a slightly higher
percentage attends courses of elementary skills like mathematics and English and
Swedish.






Employment states 5 years after maternity leave:
(Excluding participants who still need to ¯nish Komvux)
Employment 40% 28%
Unemployment 17% 4%
Out of the labor force 9% 12%
Right-censored because of childbirth 9% 26%
Right-censored because of training program 3% 2%
Right-censored because of observation window 22% 28%
Average semesterly wage SEK 83,000 SEK 80,900
21Table 9: Course Characteristics: Out{of{the{Labor{Force Before (Potential) Par-
ticipation
Receive grant 69%
More than 25% Mathematics 11%
More than 25% Swedish or English 38%
Some orientation course 27%
More than 25% other courses 76%
4 Estimation Method and Implementation
We apply the widely used conditional di®erence{in{di®erences estimator (CDiD)
in order to estimate the treatment on the treated e®ects (see for example Heck-
man, Ichimura, Smith and Todd 1998, and Bergemann, Fitzenberger and Speckesser
2008)). It has been shown that this estimation method is very well suited to handle
selectivity issues which are common in evaluation studies using nonexperimental
data (see Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd, 1998 and Smith and Todd, 2005).
The conditional di®erence{in{di®erences estimator combines matching with tak-
ing di®erence{in{di®erences. The matching part of this estimation approach con-
trols for selection on observables. Here, we implement matching by estimating
a propensity score for participation in Komvux, which we then use in our local
linear kernel estimation in order to match treated individuals to nonparticipants.
7
We only match treated to those nontreated in case the nontreated gave birth
in the same semester and they have the same employment status in the semester
before the treated go into Komvux.8 These two conditions secure that the indi-
viduals face the same labor market conditions at the time around birth and they
experience the same labor market dynamics shortly before going in Komvux. It
has been proven that it is essential to take these conditions into account in order
7We use Silverman's Rule of Thumb for the bandwidth choice (Silverman 1986). A sensitivity
analysis showed that the results do not change when using half or double of the bandwidth.
8In our application of this approach, we found that those women, who go into Komvux
immediately after parental leave are very similar in terms of their treatment e®ect to those who
are unemployed. We therefore included those to the unemployment sample but naturally then
conditioning on being in parental leave in the semester before.
22to receive reliable estimates for treatment parameters (see for example Heckman
and Smith 1999). We estimate the propensity score on the basis of a paramet-
ric probit where we include time{invariant characteristics such as age in 1996,
number of children, education, origin, and the income of the partner in the ¯rst
semester of 1996.
We consider selection on time invariant unobservable characteristics by im-
plementing the di®erence{in{di®erences estimator in matched samples. The pre{
program di®erence is calculated as an average of the two semesters before birth.
Our inference uses a bootstrap approach with 200 resamples to take account of
the estimation error in the propensity score.
We use two di®erent outcome variables, employment rate and semesterly
wages. When estimating the treatment e®ect on wages we condition on the treated
and the matched nontreated to be employed { otherwise we would not observe
their wages. By conditioning on the employment status we are able to avoid prob-
lematic settings, for example assuming a wage/income of 0, for those individuals
that are not employed. Such an imputation would make it di±cult to interpret the
estimates of the treatment parameters as productivity e®ects, which we, however,
aim at.
Finally, it should be noted that going in training as a program of ALMP and
having another child are treated as a censoring event, i.e. starting from this point
on the individuals are not included anymore in the treatment or nontreatment
group.
We conducted a large number of additional sensitivity analysis concerning
speci¯c settings of our approach. For example, treating all types of participation
in ALMP as censoring events (instead of being unemployed) does not change
the results. Furthermore, we checked how the participation de¯nition of being in
Komvux in°uences the results. When including women who only follow Komvux
for one semester or for less than 350 hours into the control group the results stay
the same. The e®ects become somewhat smaller when including courses that last
for more than 4 semesters. Finally, we also checked how sensitive the results are
with respect to the time-aggregation of the di®erent labor market spells within
a semester into semesterly outcomes (see Appendix concerning details of these).
It turns out that the evaluation results are also very stable concerning changes
of these settings. For example, it does not matter whether one gives priority to
unemployment or employment, when there are overlaps of these two spell types.
235 Empirical results
We discuss the estimation results by way of graphical illustrations, see Figures
1 to 7.9 The basic set up of the ¯gures is the following: The thick curved line
displays the CDID{estimates relative to the start of participation. The dotted line
around shows the 95% con¯dence{interval which is estimated with the aid of 200
bootstrap resamples. The success criterion is either the employment probability
or wages.10
The time at which the evaluation starts depends on the success criterion.
For the employment rate we are able to estimate the treatment e®ect starting
immediately with begin of the participation. This approach takes the view that
the time in the program is lost time on the labor market. However, concerning the
wage e®ect we have to take a di®erent view, as the main part of the participants
do not work during participation. Therefore we are only able to estimate the wage
e®ects in case all participants have left Komvux which is in semesters 5 after the
start of the participation.
Where possible, we present results for participating in adult education on av-
erage and also distinguish di®erent course types. Hereby, we will look particularly
whether courses that contain a signi¯cant amount of Mathematics, Swedish or
English, some orientation course or a signi¯cant amount of other topics might
work particularly well for the actual participating women.
We ¯rst discuss the average treatment e®ect for the women who went into
Komvux from unemployment or directly from parental leave. The results of the
estimated e®ects on the employment probability are shown in Figure 1. The av-
erage e®ect over all program types is negative until 4 years after the start of
the program. Only after 5 years, the treatment{on{the{treated e®ect becomes
positive and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. At the end of the observation pe-
riod, i.e. 6.5 years after the start of the program the participation increased the
employment rate by 10 percentage points.
By contrast, the e®ect on the wages is already positive three years after the
start of the program. Five years after the start, the wages has increased by ap-
proximately 10.000 SEK per semester due to the participation in adult education.
As anticipated in Section 1, the estimated wage e®ect does not display the post-
9The tables with coe±cient estimates for the conditional di®erence{in{di®erences outcome
equations are available upon request.
10We only document estimates that are based on at least 50 observations.
24program dip typically encountered in studies of e®ects on annual earnings. This is
because the latter outcome is confounded by the sluggish employment adjustment
whereas the wage outcome is not. Of course, our time-aggregation into semesters
may still lead to some apparent gradualness in the wage e®ect during the ¯rst
years after participation. In any case, as a by-product of the paper, we may con-
clude that wage data allow for a faster program evaluation than earnings data, if
interest is in productivity e®ects.
Figure 1: Average Treatment{on{the{Treated E®ect on Employment, if Unem-
ployed or in Parental Leave before Participation in Komvux { Average over All
Program Types
25Figure 2: Average Treatment{on{the{Treated E®ect on Wage, if Unemployed or

























































































































































































































28Figure 5: Average Treatment{on{the{Treated E®ect for Non{Scandinavian
Women if Unemployed or Parental Leave before Participation in Komvux { Av-
erage over All Program Types
The estimation results by course types do not display much variation (see
Figure 3 and 4). Courses with a signi¯cant amount of mathematics seem to im-
prove employment and wages slightly less than other courses, while courses that
include an orientation course seem to be slightly more bene¯cial. However, these
di®erences are not signi¯cant. Notice that a comparison of ATT estimates across
course types e®ectively amounts to a comparison of di®erent subsets of treated
individuals.
29Figure 6: Average Treatment{on{the{Treated E®ect on Employment, if Out{of{
the{Labor{Force before Participation in Komvux { Average over All Program
Types
It is conceivable that certain population groups bene¯t more from adult educa-
tion more than others. We therefore estimated the treatment e®ect separately for
Non-Scandinavian women. Indeed, the point estimates indicate mostly a sightly
higher treatment e®ect, although they are never signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
The size of the subsample of Non-Scandinavian women may simply be too small
for meaningful inference.
Women who are out of the labor- force before attending Komvux display quite
a di®erent structure of the treatment e®ects than women who are unemployed
or in parental leave. A positive treatment e®ect only shows up by way of an
increase of the employment probability. The size of this e®ect has, however, quite
a considerable size with about 15 percentage points 5 years after the start. In
contrast the e®ect on wages is relatively close to zero and at no point statistically
signi¯cantly.
30Figure 7: Average Treatment{on{the{Treated E®ect on Wage, if Out{of{the{
Labor{Force before Participation in Komvux { Average over All Program Types
6 Calibration of a model of job search and adult
education
6.1 Job search model
A major puzzle emerging from the previous section is why not more women
participate in adult education. Less than 20% per semester °ow into Komvux
even though entry is not restricted and the average e®ects on the treated are
quite large. Moreover, the vast majority (88%) of those who do go into Komvux
receive UBS or a similar grant, so it is unlikely that the low in°ow for the average
women is due to rationing of the income support grants.
To understand the enrollment decision, we examine the costs and bene¯ts
of di®erent options at the individual level, using a dynamic job search model.
Job search theory tries to describe the behavior of unemployed individuals in a
dynamic and uncertain environment. We develop a job search model that allows
for participation in adult education before ¯nding a job, and that also takes
account of other relevant institutional and behavioral aspects of the labor market
for reintegrating mothers. The model is in discrete time, with a semester as the
time unit.
Consider ¯rst the process leading to employment, in absence of an adult edu-
31cation program, for an unemployed woman who has given birth and has completed
a ¯xed time in parental leave. Job o®ers arrive at random moments in time. If
one is not employed then in every period there is a probability ¸ that an o®er
arrives. Jobs pay a wage w. In line with the theoretical and empirical literature on
search theory, we do not distinguish jobs by the weekly number of hours worked.
Equivalently, we assume that all jobs are full-time jobs. Individuals do not know
in advance when job o®ers arrive. Every time an o®er arrives, the decision has
to be made whether to accept it or to reject it and search further. We assume
that once a job is accepted it will be kept forever at the same wage. During
unemployment, per-period income b is received.
Unemployed individuals aim at maximization of their own expected present
value of utility over an in¯nite horizon. We assume that utility is intertemporally
separable and equals the instantaneous income °ow w in case one works at a wage
w and b in case one is out of work. Clearly, in the absence of wage dispersion, any
su±ciently high ¯xed value of w leads to acceptance at the ¯rst possible moment.
Let r be the rate of discount (meaning that utility one period ahead has
weight 1=(1 + r) in the current present value), and let R denote the expected
present value when following the optimal strategy. We assume that the model is
stationary (see e.g. Eckstein and Van den Berg, 2007). It follows that










We now introduce adult education into the model. Consider ¯rst the \treat-
ment e®ects" of having participated in adult education. We allow program par-
ticipation to a®ect both the per-period probability of receiving a job o®er and
the wage o®er. The latter re°ects any productivity di®erences due to the human
capital accumulation in adult education. The former re°ects the corresponding
increase in the number of suitable vacancies. It also re°ects any job search assis-
tance e®orts that are made because of the program participation. For example,
the case worker of the individual may make additional e®orts to ¯nd a job for
the individual upon ¯nishing program participation. Richardson and Van den
Berg (2008) argue that this is the major reason for the fact that unemployed
individuals in Sweden have a higher exit rate to work after a spell of labor mar-
ket training. We use an index i in ¸i and wi to denote whether the structural
determinant refers to the periods before (i = 0) or after (i = 1) program partici-
pation. Participation in Komvux takes 2 periods. We assume that individuals do
32not enter Komvux for a second participation spell.
Now consider the program enrollment process and childbirth. We extend the
model, by allowing for 4 states: K, U, E and P, denoting Komvux, Unemploy-
ment, Employment, and Parental leave, respectively. We again consider a mother
without employment having just completed her spell in P. In accordance to the
actual Komvux setting, we assume that she can move into K in every time period,
provided that she is unemployed. For convenience we assume that the decision
to enroll and the decision to accept or reject a job o®er are sequential. That
is, before having received any job o®er in a given period, the individual decides
whether to enroll or not. If the individual does not choose K then she moves into
U for the rest of the semester. Since the model is stationary, the decision to go
into Komvux is essentially made right after having left P. If it is not optimal to
enter Komvux at that moment then it is never optimal afterwards.
Having another child is modelled as the outcome of a process during U. Specif-
ically, during U, a birth occurs with probability ³. Birth is followed by 2 periods
in P, and then by entry into U. Also, after K, the individual moves into U. We
may allow for a transition rate from E back into U, but that would complicate
the numerical analysis while for reasonable orders of magnitude the numerical
results on the decision for or against K are barely in°uenced by it. As we shall
see in the next subsection, the value of this transition rate does play a role in the
calibration of the model.
During K, the woman receives income support z, while during P she receives
parental leave bene¯ts p. In K and in E, the woman incurs child care costs c.
Let R0 denote the expected present value of U after having decided not to
enroll into K, and let f R0 denote the present value upon leaving P, before having
decided whether to enroll into K. Next, let R1 denote the expected present value
after K. Furthermore, let Pi denote the present value upon entering P, where
i = 1 (i = 0) if the individual has (has not) participated in K since the birth of
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The individual chooses for K if and only if the ¯rst term in the right-hand side
of (4) is smaller than the second term.
It is clear from (2) that the size of ¸1 ¡¸0 summarizes the employment e®ect
of K, while w1 ¡ w0 equals the wage e®ect. So far, we have not considered that
individuals may move from employment back into unemployment. Suppose this
occurs at the rate ±. Then the steady-state employment rate equals ¸i=(¸i + ±).
The latter is a non-linear function of ¸i. At typical values of ¸i and ± (e.g.
¸i = 0:1± = 1 per semester, resulting in steady-state employment rate values of
90%; see e.g. Ridder and Van den Berg, 2003), the derivative of the employment
rate with respect to ¸i is very small. This means that a small increase in the
employment rate is mirrored by a large increase in ¸i. In particular, a small
di®erence between the long-run employment rates of Komvux participants and
Komvux non-participants may go along with a large di®erence ¸1 ¡ ¸0. At the
same time, a large di®erence ¸1 ¡ ¸0 may imply a large di®erence between the
present values R0 and R1 of the unemployed in the two groups. To see this, notice
that present values assign higher weights to events in the near future. A high job
o®er arrival rate means a shorter average duration of the current unemployment
spell, and therefore a shorter waiting time until the income °ow is increased.11
We can extend the model further by allowing for transitions into non-participation.
The simplest way to do this is to introduce an additional exit state with corre-
sponding exit probability, by analogy to Van den Berg (1990). Moreover, we
can make it optimal for women to move into K some semesters after parental
leave rather than immediately, by allowing for sources of non-stationarity into
the model. 12 However, the former would lead to problems with calibrating the
model (see the next subsection). The latter would complicate the model substan-
tially, presumably without generating major additional insights (see again the
next subsection). Another extension would be to allow for wage dispersion. In
that case, the comparative statics e®ects of ¸1 ¡¸0 and w1 ¡w0 are described in
Van den Berg (1994) and Burdett (1981), respectively.
11It is not di±cult to demonstrate this formally, using the equations in this subsection.
12Some structural empirical studies have estimated job search models that are somewhat
similar to ours, in that they allow women to choose at any time for an outside option (Frijters
and Van der Klaauw, 2006) or allow for participation in training programs (Adda et al., 2006).
346.2 Calibration
In this subsection we quantify the model and we infer the implications for the
enrollment decision. We quantify the variables or parameters b;w0;p;z;c; and ³
by using averages of the data at our disposal. Next, we quantify ¸0 from external
sources, and we quantify ¸1 ¡ ¸0 and w1 ¡ w0 using the estimates from the
previous section. Table 10 gives the results of this procedure. In the absence of
reliable information on the discount rate r, we consider a range of values for
this parameter. In general, the quanti¯cation of the model depends on a range
of debatable assumptions, as does the model speci¯cation itself. It is therefore
important to point out in advance that the main qualitative conclusions are very
robust with respect to all this.
We now describe in some detail the subsamples used to quantify b;w0;p;z;c;
and ³. The variable b is taken to be the average Unemployment Insurance (UI)
bene¯ts level among women who receive UI. Some individuals without work do
not qualify for UI, and it is di±cult to assign an income level to them. For
example, their subsistence may be supported by a fraction of the income of other
household members. To avoid such ad-hoc procedures, we restrict attention to
UI recipients. We take the average semesterly UI receipt over semesterly U spells
per individual, and we subsequently average over individuals. The parental leave
bene¯ts p and the Komvux income grant z are quanti¯ed in essentially the same
way, excluding Komvux spells without any income grant. The wage rate w0 is the
average semesterly wage among women in E in the semester before the childbirth
of interest. The child care costs are quanti¯ed as the average in case of having two
children and using care for 40 hours per week. The rate ³ of bearing an additional
child is taken as the semesterly average over 3 to 13 semesters after the childbirth
of interest.
The employment states and transitions shortly before and after childbirth
are not suitable for the quanti¯cation of the transition rate ¸0 from U to E,
because of the dip in employment around the date of childbirth, and because spells
out of work can be labor-market non-participation spells. We therefore rely on
information in Albrecht, Van den Berg and Vroman (2008) instead. They calibrate
a job search model using Swedish data from 1996, i.e. right before our Komvux-
spells observation window. They distinguish between di®erent skill levels, and
for our purposes we only have to focus on low-skilled workers and low-skilled
jobs. Their continuous-time transition rate from U to E equals 1.867 per year,
35Table 10: Calibration input values
unemployment bene¯ts b 41,858
wage rate w0 without Komvux 63,508
parental leave bene¯ts p 51,651
Komvux income grant z 42,780
child care costs c 12,120
next-child birth rate ³ 0.03
job o®er arrival rate ¸0 without Komvux 0.607
wage rate w1 after Komvux 73,198
job o®er arrival rate ¸1 after Komvux 0.690
Note: the units are SEK and 6 months.
which implies that the probability that U is left within 6 months equals 0.607.
We take this to equal our ¸0. In order to calculate ¸1 from the employment e®ect
of Komvux as estimated in the previous section, we also need to quantify the
transition rate ± from E to U. (For expositional convenience, we imposed ± = 0
in our model, but this can be relaxed without computational cost, and in any
case the qualitative results do not depend on this apart from the quanti¯cation
of ¸1.) Following the same procedure as for ¸0, we derive from Albrecht, Van den
Berg and Vroman (2008) the value of 0.0842 for ±. Subsequently, ¸1 follows from
the estimation result that (¸1=(¸1 + ±)) ¡ ¸0=(¸0 + ±) = 0:013, where the latter
number is the ATT estimate averaged over 5 to 13 semesters after in°ow into K.
This gives ¸1 = 0:690. Finally, the post-Komvux wage rate w1 follows from the
ATT estimate averaged over 5 to 13 semesters after in°ow into K.
Table 11 gives the results for the model outcomes, for two discount rates:
0.05 per semester and 0.20 per semester. The ¯rst value is conventional, and we
take the corresponding results as our baseline calibration results. The variable
EPV(K) is the expected present value of choosing to enroll in Komvux, i.e. the
second term in the right-hand side of (4). Clearly, the di®erence between R0 and
EPV(K) is of particular interest, as this determines the choice for or against
36Table 11: Calibration results




f R0 1198 294
corresponding °ow values:
rR0=(1 + r) 50.7 49.0
rR1=(1 + r) 59.8 56.7
rEPV(K)=(1 + r) 57.1 48.8
rf R0=(1 + r) 57.1 49.0
Note: the units are 1000 SEK and 6 months.
participation in Komvux.
The calibrated model unambiguously predicts that participation in Komvux
is bene¯cial for the individual. Choosing for K does have two short-term dis-
advantages over entering U. First, z ¡ c < b, so that the instantaneous income
°ow in K is smaller than in U. Secondly, the individual is con¯ned to K for two
periods, whereas one may be able to leave U for E during any of these periods.
However, these short-term disadvantages do not o®set the long-run advantages
of K. Once employed, the semesterly income is about SEK 10,000 higher if one
has participated in K. In present values, with r = 0:05, this is an increase of
almost SEK 200,000, or almost 20%. From Table 11 it follows that the price to
be paid for this improvement is only about SEK 50,000 of foregone earnings due
to Komvux participation.
The ¯nal column of Table 11 gives calibration results for a 0.20 discount rate.
This is a very high value; it implies indi®erence between having 1 krona in 12
months from now and having 1=(1+r)2 = 0.69 kronor today. With such an unreal-
istically high r, the individual is virtually indi®erent between going into Komvux
and not going into it. The future rewards of participation are then insu±ciently
37important to o®set the short-run costs. In this case, with an \average" mother
being indi®erent, one would expect that about half of the relevant population of
mothers would bene¯t from Komvux, whereas the net return would be negative
for the other half. As the actual Komvux in°ow rate is much lower than 50%,
it follows that even the r = 0:20 scenario is not su±ciently extreme to explain
why so few mothers enter Komvux in the context of our model. Evidently, there
are strong non-pecuniary factors that make young mothers prefer not to enter
Komvux. The alternative option of becoming unemployed or a non-participant in
the labor market are more attractive because they deliver utility that is absent
while being in Komvux. It is likely that this concerns the possibility to be home
with the infant. Presumably, young mothers are willing to give up monetary ad-
vantages in return for being able to take care full-time of the infant after it has
reached the age of one.
The option of entering Komvux can be made more attractive by increasing
the income grant z or by decreasing the child care costs while in Komvux. The
size of the e®ect depends on the distribution of the unobserved utility that women
attach to being able to stay home with their one-year old child. Moreover, the
average treatment e®ects among the treated may decrease if the fraction of women
entering Komvux increases.
From the discussion of the results in Table 11 it is clear that the qualitative
implications of the baseline calibration are very robust to a range of assumptions.
One simply needs drastically di®erent parameter values in order to reverse the
main predictions.
7 Conclusions
Among women who are without work after childbirth, participation in adult
education has a signi¯cant positive causal e®ect on their labor market prospects.
Both the wage rate and the employment rate are on average higher than in the
counterfactual situation in which the mother does not follow adult education.
This is important because women without work after childbirth sometimes do
not qualify for labor market training and other programs to bring unemployed
back to work. In such cases, adult education may be the only skill-enhancing
program available. Moreover, direct costs of adult education are generally low or
absent. In sum, adult education is a useful and accessible program to prevent
38young mothers from entering a downward spiral of joblessness and skill loss.
The positive e®ects of adult education have not led to a massive in°ow into
the program. To understand this, we calibrate a dynamic job search model that
includes adult education as an option. We use income data in employment, un-
employment, parental leave, and in adult education, as well as data on child care,
and the estimated e®ects of adult education, to quantify the model. We ¯nd that
adult education increases the individual's total expected discounted income. For
an average individual, the short-run costs (lock-in time in education; child care
while following education) are by far outweighted by the long-run advantages in
terms of income. We conclude that there are strong non-pecuniary factors that
make young mothers prefer not to enter adult education, notably the possibility
to be home with the infant. Young mothers are willing to give up monetary ad-
vantages in return for being able to take care full-time of the infant after it has
reached the age of one.
The option of entering adult education can be made more attractive by in-
creasing the income grant or decreasing the child care costs while in education. It
is an interesting topic for further research to investigate this further. For example,
regional or temporal variation in child care costs and in the availability of income
grants may be used to assess the role of this in the enrollment and the e®ects of
adult education.
The link between the conditional di®erence-in-di®erences estimates of the
treatment e®ects on the one hand and the economic model on the other hand led
to some additional insights. First of all, in general, small e®ects on the employ-
ment probability may go along with larger e®ects on the expected discounted
value of program participation and also with larger e®ects on the exit rate to
work. This is because employment rates are typically unresponsive functions of
the job o®er arrival rate, and because present values assign higher weights to
income in the nearest future than to income in the long run.
Secondly, wage rate outcomes do not display the post-program dip that is
typically encountered in studies of e®ects on annual earnings. This is because the
latter outcome is confounded by the sluggish employment adjustment whereas the
wage rate outcome is not. It follows that wage data allow for a faster program
evaluation than earnings data, if interest is in productivity e®ects.
39A Data Appendix
The basic sample consists of women who are low or medium skilled in 1996 and
who gave birth in the time period from 1996 to 2004. We only consider prime
aged women (25 to 45 years in 1996) for whom it is at most their ¯fth child. In
total we observe 208.420 women ful¯lling the selection criteria.
A.1 KOMVUX
The KOMVUX data is collected at a semesterly frequency, i.e. there are separate
records for every semester and every course an individual participates in. Often,
records already indicate if a course is supposed to last longer than one semester.
Then the start and formal end date of records collected at consecutive semesters
are the same. The separate records di®er with respect to the information which
changes over consecutive semesters as for example number of teaching hours.
Sometimes, however, one record reports an end in one semester and another
record reports a restart in the following semester. There are also cases where
records report individuals attending a speci¯c course type more than once in the
same semester.
The data contains a drop-out date in case an individual ends a course pre-
maturely. Note that there is no strict relationship with respect to the reported
drop-out date and the semester for which the main part of the information is
collected (in the following denoted as reporting semester). The drop-out date can
lie during, before and after the reporting semester. There are also missings in the
variables for the end date and drop-out date.
We observe 74,377 women of our basic sample attending the adult education
program between II/1997 and II/2002.
We perform the following steps to make the data accessible for the analysis:
(i). We discard individuals permanently from our sample in case at least one of
the following 4 conditions applies:
(a) Attending courses that started before II/1997: 3,114 women
(b) Attending courses that end after II/2002: 5,312 women
(c) Courses with missing end dates: 641 women
(d) Implausible start, end or dropout date (for example, courses with neg-
ative durations): 19 women
40Remaining women participating in adult education: 65,291. The data set
contains 813,541 di®erent records describing their participation in adult
education.
(ii). Records are discarded from the treatment sample, if the following applies:
(a) Start and end date coincide (2,597 records).
(b) Zero teaching hours (2,830 records).
(iii). Decisions and assumptions concerning the drop-out variable: On semester
level 10 % of the records report a drop out (85,003 records)
(a) In 5,156 cases the drop out occurs before or on the start date of the
course. We delete these cases. 64,812 participating women remain.
(b) Drop-out dates can also lie after the formal end date (3,140 records).
Individuals who drop out after the end date of the course always have
a missing in their grade. We assume that these individuals participated
in the course but did not successfully pass it.
(c) On the basis of the information on teaching hours and the drop-out
date, a variable is created giving the hours of attendance. 1083 records
have 0 hour of attendance. These cases were discarded. 64,803 partic-
ipating women remain.
(d) We de¯ne a new end variable, providing information on the time an
individual stopped attending a course. Consequently, in case an indi-
vidual dropped out of a course before the formal end date, we use the
drop-out date as the new end date.
Note that if due to (ii) and (iii) no record of participation for an individual
is left, an individual is automatically de¯ned as a Komvux nonparticipant
and will appear in the sample of nonparticipants, whereas an individual
who is discarded under the conditions of (i) is a participant for whom the
information is incomplete or inconsistent. As a result she does not appear
in the sample of nonparticipants.
(iv). Merging of records of the same course type:
(a) Double records concerning the same individual and the same time
period are identi¯ed by way of the course code, number of high school
41points, number of hours taught, start date and semester reporting
period. In the majority of case, double entries are due to individuals
switching schools. We give priority to those records which have a valid
grade.
(b) Records for the same individual with the same course code are merged
to one spell if they lie within one uninterrupted participation spell in
adult education. The records which are merged under this condition
to one spell are denoted in the following as \merge set".
(c) Naturally, the start date of a merged spell is the earliest start date of
all records in a merge set. The end date is the last date within the
merge set, at which we observe an individual to attend the course.
Furthermore, we report the total number of hours attended.
(d) As mentioned before, some records report start dates which lie before
the reporting period and some records report end dates which lie after
the reporting period. In the majority of cases we ¯nd ¯tting records in
an earlier, respectively later reporting period. We de¯ne records as ¯t-
ting if their reporting semester covers the start or respective end date
in question. They do not necessarily need to have the same start or
end date. However, this matching process does not work for small per-
centage of the course type speci¯c participation spells. In those case,
we give priority to the information which is related to the reporting
semesters. As a result we set the start date of the spells that started
before the reporting semester to the beginning of the earliest reporting
semester within the merge set. Those spells that ended after the end
of the last reporting semester are treated as dropouts at the end date
of the last reporting semester within the merge set.
42(v). After the selection process of individuals, the following distribution of at-
tended hours in adult education can be observed:
Hours attended Freq. Percent Cum.
-50 6,427 9.92 9.92
51-100 4,923 7.60 17.51
101-250 8,939 13.79 31.31
251-500 10,137 15.64 46.95
501-750 9,229 14.24 61.19
751-1000 8,267 12.76 73.95
1001-1250 5,576 8.60 82.56
1251-1500 4,313 6.66 89.21
1501-1750 2,699 4.16 93.38
1751-2000 1,742 2.69 96.06
2000- 2,550 3.94 100.00
Total 64,802 100.00
(vi). We receive the following distribution concerning program length. Note that




1 17,060 26.33 26.33
2 15,892 24.52 50.85
3 10,050 15.51 66.36
4 6,907 10.66 77.02
5 3,851 5.94 82.96
6 3,285 5.07 88.03
7 2,355 3.63 91.66
8 2,039 3.15 94.81
9 1,436 2.22 97.03
10 1,153 1.78 98.81
11 774 1.19 100.00
Total 64,802 100.00
43(vii). We summarize course type speci¯c participation into the four categorizes
mathematics, Swedish and English, orientation courses, and all other courses.
Dummies for participation in these groups are constructed according to pro-
portion of attended hours:
Dummy = 1 for under the condition
Mathematics proportion of attended hours > 25%
Swedish and English proportion of attended hours> 25%
Orientation Courses proportion of attended hours> 0%
Other courses proportion of attended hours> 25%
A.2 Employment and Wage Data (RAMS)
The employment information and the wage data is taken from the wage infor-
mation which ¯rms are obliged to give to the tax authorities. For every calendar
year, all ¯rms have to inform the tax authorities about the employment duration
of each employee (on a monthly basis) and on his/her yearly wage. This obligation
determines the structure of the RAMS data which consists of separate registers
for every year. The employment duration of an individual in a speci¯c year is
given by the start month and the end month. In addition, there is a variable for
the wage paid during this employment relationship. We use the registers for the
year 1994 until 2003.
Income from the social insurance, as for example parental bene¯ts, is not
covered by the data. An individual is counted as employed when being on parental
leave, if s/he was employed shortly before. However, we can create maternity leave
spells within the employment spells. Eriksson (2005) reports for 2001 an average
length of maternity leave of 10 months within the ¯rst 18 months after child birth.
We use this estimated number of 10 months as the maternity leave period length
in our observation window period of child birth (1996 to 2001). The parental-
leave compensation rate increased from 75% to 80% in this period, but apart
from this the regulations did not change. Before 1996 and after 2001 the parental
leave system was changed a number of times (see Table 2.3).
The bene¯ts received during maternity leave will be calculated with the aid
of an additional data set (LOUISE, see below).
With respect to the RAMS data on the months of employment, there are
records where both, the variable for the start month and the variable of the end
44month, take the value 0. In these cases we set the start month on January and
the end month on December.
We exclude women who are self-employed or farmers (17,812 individuals).
This results in 2,240.452 records for 185,300 individuals of our basic sample con-
ditional on never being self-employed or farmer in time from 1994 to 2003. Nat-
urally, individuals can have multiple employers in one calendar year. In order to
exclude extreme outliers, we drop individuals from our sample with more than
10 employers in one year (365 individuals).
We split employer{speci¯c employment spells into half{calendar{year long
segments. We then aggregate employment spells which are parallel, partly over-
lapping or consecutive within the half calendar year periods. Finally, the average
monthly wage is calculated.
A.3 Unemployment spell data (HÄ ANDEL):
Within HÄ ANDEL, two complementary registers describe unemployment spells.
The ¯rst one is INSPER, describing the unemployment duration and the exit
state after leaving unemployment. The second is SOKATPER. This describes the
status during the unemployment spell. Unemployment states such as in guidance
service, part-time unemployed and participation in a variety of ALMP are listed.
We exclusively use the SOKATPER data set. The only additional information
which INSPER could o®er over SOKATPER is the exit state, which we know
anyway by combining the unemployment spells with the employment spells. The
unemployment data is reliable starting with 1993. However, we only consider
unemployment spells starting after or ongoing on 01.01.1994 as the bene¯t data
is only reliable after that date.
About 70% of the women in our basic sample (146,056 of 208,420) have at
least one unemployment spell during the time between 01.01.1994 until 31.03.04.
In total we observe 1,506,581 unemployment subspells. We delete those spells
with a negative duration (12,890).
45We summarized the unemployment states to the following aggregates:
Category Unemployment state
(1) unemployed
(2) partly unemployed (=part-time unemployed or
employed by the hour)
(3) searching for a new job
(4) labor market training
(5) other category not registered (other than 1,2,3,4,6)
(6) other ALMP (other than 4 )
We split the unemployment (status) spells at the middle and the end of every
calendar year in order to obtain outcomes on a half-year basis. This results in
2,288,085 potentially split unemployment spells.
We then drop those unemployment status spells which indicate that individ-
uals were searching for a new job while being employed. Furthermore, we exclude
those individuals completely from our analysis who have category `5' spells, as
we are not able to interpret them.
There is no regularity concerning how women are registered when being un-
employed and giving birth to a child, although caseworkers are recommended to
deregister individuals during the time of the maternity leave. Sometimes they
continue to be registered as unemployed, although not receiving unemployment
bene¯ts. Sometimes they are changed to the status partly unemployed, often only
for the ¯rst few months after child birth. We therefore also create maternity leave
spells for unemployed women of 10 months of duration.
A.4 Unemployment bene¯t registers (ASTAT):
The unemployment bene¯t data stem from two di®erent data bases. Together,
they cover the unemployment bene¯t payments to all Swedish inhabitants in the
time period from 1994 to 2004. The ¯rst register, ERSBET, covers mainly the
time period from 1994 to 1999 . The second register, ASUBET, covers mainly
the time period from 2000 to 2004. The bene¯t payments are reported by both
registers on a weekly basis. The two registers are, however, somewhat di®erent
with respect to how and what kind of information is recorded.
46A.4.1 ERSBET
The structure of the data is such that on an individual level for each calendar week
the number of compensation days for a speci¯c type of compensation is mentioned
together with the amount paid for this week. For our basic sample there are
9,012,082 di®erent records of bene¯t payments. 8644 of those are double entries.
A double entry occurs if there are two records for the same type of compensation
made to the same individual for the same calendar week. We keep the last added
observation.
There are missings in the variable for bene¯t payments. This is, however,
exclusively the case when a time interval is described as waiting period. Therefore
we set these cases on a zero bene¯t level. Sometimes, several records are reported
for one calendar week. The main reason for this lies in the fact that on di®erent
days of the week individuals are eligible for di®erent types of compensations.
There are also speci¯c payment combinations which can occur at the same time.
We add payments of parallel records and keep only the aggregated record. This
reduces the number of observations to 8,575,751.
A.4.2 ASUBET
For our basic sample we receive 5,789,769 records in ASUBET. The data set
contains a marker for individuals with double/wrong entries. We drop those in-
dividuals (18 individuals with 1,175 records). The data set does not have missing
values in the variable for the bene¯t payments. We identify additional 58,075
double entries, of which we we keep the latest added entry. Furthermore, we ag-
gregate parallel entries by adding the bene¯t payments. In total we end up with
5,626,984 records.
A.4.3 Merging of Unemployment Bene¯t Data Sets
ERSBET and ASUBET partly cover the same individuals. In case there are
duplicate records, we keep those from ASUBET. In total there are 1,336,357
duplicate records. We keep in total 12,866,399 records.
A.5 Merging of Bene¯t and Unemployment Spell Data
The aggregated unemployment status data is the reference point for the merge
process of the unemployment and the bene¯t data. We restrict our data to the end
47of 2003, to be precise until 29.12.2003 which is the end of a calendar week. After
dropping those individuals who were excluded during the cleaning process of the
bene¯t data, we obtain in total 2,241,098 unemployment status spells for 145,249
individuals and 12,083,677 bene¯t spells for 178,466 individuals. We merge the
weekly bene¯t data to the aggregated unemployment state data if they overlap
for at least 4 days. On the basis of this 4 day criterion 74,461 unemployment
bene¯t records can not be merged to an unemployment spell. For those records
we reduce the merge criterion to an overlap of at least one day. If the bene¯t
spell overlaps with more than one unemployment state spell it is only merged to
the ¯rst overlapping unemployment state spell. This additional one day criterion
reduces the bene¯t records which can not be merged to 54,025. In the third step,
also bene¯t records which are not allocated yet, are merged to unemployment
spells which directly succeed or precede. In total, for 4,470 individuals we are
not able to allocate on average about 11 weeks of bene¯t records. We drop these
individuals completely from our analysis.
We calculate the average monthly bene¯t payments for the unemployment
spells which are a maximum of 6 months long on the basis of the following formula
(sum of bene¯t payments during the spell/number of days during spell)*7*4.33.
A.6 Merging of Employment, Unemployment and Komvux
Data
In a ¯rst step we delete from our data base all observations from those individuals
that we excluded for one of the above mentioned reason. Table 12 summarizes
this sample selection process, together with additional selection criteria that are
described in the main part of the paper (see Section 3.2). Note that individuals
are only mentioned once here, although there can be multiple reasons why they
are excluded.
48Merging the employment and the unemployment data is not straight forward,
as there are time intervals where people are reported simultaneously as being
unemployed and employed. We treat these parallel spells in the following way:
(i). If an unemployment status spell and an employment spell overlap for at
most 30 days then the employment spell is shortened. The reason for this
lies in the fact that we only have the monthly records for the employment
data and the unemployment data is recorded daily. The calculated average
monthly wage is adjusted accordingly.
(ii). We generate a new status \partly employed" (code 3) during an overlap
of an unemployment status spell indicating \part{time unemployed" and
an employment spell, if the overlap last longer than 30 days. For this time
period we report the average income from employment and separately the
average bene¯t payments.
(iii). For the time that there is an overlap of more than 30 days of an unemploy-
ment spell indicating fulltime unemployment and an employment spell, we
de¯ne an overlap status \unemployed with side job" (code 0). Also for this
time period we report the average income from employment and separately
the average bene¯t payments.
For those time periods without records of unemployment or employment we
create `out of the labor market' spells. In case a mother gives birth during these
`out of the labor market' spells we automatically interrupted these spells by 10
months maternity leave spells.
Finally, we treat being in Komvux as a priority state that dominates all other
states. In case a person is employed while being in Komvux the income is recorded
accordingly.
A.7 LOUISE-Data
With the aid of the annual LOUISE data we de¯ne households in which the
women live in, separately for each year. The LOUISE data set contains a family
identi¯cation variable which de¯nes a couple as a family in case they are married
or live in a registered partnership or live together with a joined child. Children
who live in the same house/appartment and are in some kind of ¯nancial depen-
dency also belong to the household. With the aid of the family identi¯cation and
49Table 12: Selection




Low and medium skilled
Birth between 1996 and 2004 (at
most ¯fth child)




No participation spells in Komvux
that started before II/1997 (107) 3,114
No participation spell in Komvux
that ended after II/2002 (108) 5,312
Consistent data on Komvux (102-106,109) 660
Consistent data on bene¯ts (301) 18
Consistent data for merging
bene¯ts and Handel (401) 4,212
Exclude self{employed and farmers (501) 16,848
Consistent data on employment (502) 341
Consistent data on HANDEL (601) 34
Remaining sample 177,881
Participants (in the broader sense) 58,576 (¼ 33%)
Participants (in the narrower sense) 23,066 (¼ 13%)
Additional Restriction on sample
Women not living with their parents (95) 5,368
Women not deregistered from Sweden (96) 3,296
Birth before 2001 (97) 34,916
Only low skilled individuals (98) 35,536
Women not entering university
during observation period (801) 6,394
Remaining sample 92,370
Participants (in the broader sense) 31,070(¼ 34%)
Participants (in the narrower sense) 12,717 (¼ 14%)
50Table 12: Continued: Selection
Selection Criteria Code Number of Number of
Observations Remaining
Dropped Observations
Repetition: Remaining sample 92,370
Further Restriction on Participation:
Leading to Dropping Individuals from Sample
No participation before II/1997 (99) 8,071
No participation during maternity leave (701) 2,754
No participation before child birth (111) 3,457
Remaining sample 78,067
Participants (in the broader sense) 20,227(¼ 26%)
Participants (in the narrower sense) 9,023 (¼ 12%)
a variable de¯ning the status the partner of the mother (to be) can be identi¯ed.
In addition we drop cases for which we do not have observations for the whole
time period (1996 to 2003), which can be due to death or emigration.
The LOUISE data set provides information on parental leave bene¯ts on a
yearly basis. We add the amount which is reported in the year of birth and the
amount reported in the consecutive year. We then calculate a monthly average
over the 10 month which we assume that women take maternity leave.
A.8 Discrete Time Analysis
A.8.1 De¯nition of Employment States
For the discrete time analysis we aggregate the spells into states of 6 month
duration. We use the following settings to accomplish this: A period is de¯ned
as employed in case an individual was employed for more than 50% of the time.
Hereby we weight the overlapping employment and unemployment spells in the
following fashion: If somebody is de¯ned as employed and unemployed she counts
as 30% employed. If she is de¯ned as employed and partly unemployed she counts
as 50% employed. These weights take into consideration that the unemployment
51data is more reliable than the employment data with respect to the timing that
labor market spell. Also the decision on that an individual has to be employed
for more than 50% of the time in order to be count as employed is connected
with the inaccuracy of the ANST data. In case a time period is not de¯ned as
employed, then it is either de¯ned as in maternity leave, unemployed, or out of
the labor force, depending which of each state is more prevailing. A women is
de¯ned as being in Komvux in case she attends a course of 2 to 4 semesters with
more than 350 hours in total.
A.8.2 Household Income
The household income consists of a number of di®erent income sources. The main
components are the income from employment and the unemployment bene¯ts.
For the mothers (to be), these income sources are calculated as described above
by way of the ANST data set and the HÄ ANDEL. The income from employment
and the unemployment bene¯ts of their partners are calculated in a similar way.
We only do not exclude farmers and self employed or restrict the sample on
10 parallel spells per year when their income from employment is determined.
Additional income sources, as social assistance, parental leave bene¯ts, sickness
allowance provided by LOUISE data are added.
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